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he world of the Scotistic author Juan Iribarne e Uraburu 
is the world of the Iberian peninsula in the ﬁ rst half of the 
seventeenth century, that time of transition and turbulence in 
the history of Western philosophy. During Juan’s lifetime, after all, 
Francis Bacon published his Novum Organum (1620), the Galileo 
trial was conducted in Rome (1633), and René Descartes published 
the programmatic for much of modern philosophy in his Discours 
de la méthode (1637). Though Juan’s thought may not develop with 
an eye to dealing with the intellectual challenges that would soon 
beset Scholastic thinkers of succeeding generations, it does bring 
to fruition certain strands of thinking within Scholasticism that 
date back to the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Its 
treatment of the metaphysical problems associated with action theory 
is very much in the line of a long series of reﬂ ections by thinkers 
belonging to the Scotistic tradition upon the meaning of Scotus’s 
teaching on will and appetite. Yet, Juan’s thought is also embedded 
in the contemporary intellectual scene in the Iberian peninsula, a 
scene occupied in part with the neo-Scotistic movement of which 
he was a member, Thomism —in several species, associated with 
various universities on the Iberian peninsula—, and Suarezianism.
Juan’s date of birth is unknown, but he was probably trained, 
from what Jacob Schmutz tells us,1 at Alcalá, Spain, studying under 
the Dominicans Juan Montesinos and Gabriel Vazquez while 
he was there. Whether he was already an Observant friar at the 
time of his university studies is unclear and his whereabouts are 
unknown for some time after he completed his university degrees, 
but he eventually became a jubilate lector in the Franciscan Order, 
qualiﬁ ed examiner of the Inquisition, and minister provincial of the 
province of Aragón. Other known honors belonging to him are that 
he was the confessor of the princess Margaret of Austria, herself 
a discalced nun at the St. Clare Convent of Madrid, and that he 
functioned as one of the synod’s examiners within the diocese of 
Saragossa. His two major philosophical and theological works are 
a massive commentary on the fourth book of Scotus’s commentary 
1. J. SCHMUTZ, Juan Iribarne e Uraburu, at “Scholasticon” (http://www.scholasticon.
fr/Database/Scholastiques_fr.php?ID=21).
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on the fourth book of the Sentences in two volumes, published in 
Spain, at Saragossa and Tarazona, in the years 1614-1615, and the 
work with which we shall be mainly concerned, the Tractatus de 
actibus humanis. 
First published in 1635 in Venice, but republished in Spain 
at Saragossa in 1643 and dedicated to the minister general of the 
Franciscan order, Juan Merineros (himself the author of compendia 
of Scotistic teaching and a well-known professor at Alcala), the 
Tractatus is a remarkable work on Scotus’s action theory. Here is 
how Juan describes it in his dedicatory letter to Merineros:
I have prepared this treatise on human acts in which I treat 
theological matter not well covered in our schools; this material 
is scattered piecemeal in various bits in the text of Scotus and is 
perhaps treated in works that have not yet been printed2.
Certainly, Juan Iribarne is not mistaken in his assertion that the 
material he treats so compendiously in his Tractatus is scattered 
throughout Scotus’s philosophical and theological writings: he cites 
from all four books of Scotus’s Commentaries on the Sentences (chieﬂ y, 
the Ordinatio) and his Quodlibet, but also shows familiarity with 
Scotus’s Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum.3 At one level, then, 
the work is itself a compendium of Scotus’s teaching, but it is much 
more than that; Juan takes clear positions on different philosophical 
problems arising out of Scotus’s views and does so by defending 
those views against alternative positions found in contemporary or 
near-contemporary authors.
The present study will focus on only three principal themes in 
the De actibus humanis: the voluntary, will, and nature. Interspersed 
with these themes will also be the subordinate themes of freedom 
2. Tractatum paravi De actibus humanis, in quo materiam verso theologicam, in Scholis 
nostris non tritam, in textu Scoti minuatim dispersam per grana et publico praelo fortasse 
nondum excusam, IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, Tractatus de actibus humanis: 
iuxta mentem Scoti (Typographica ofﬁ cina Regii Nosocomii Deiparae de gratia, 
Caesaraugustae [Saragossa], 1643) epistula censuram deprecans.
3. See, for example, Juan’s citation of Scotus’s QQ. super lib. Metaph. at disp. 3 sectio 
8 (Ibidem, 50b): “Circa hoc dubium notato verba Scoti lib. 6 Metaphysicae qu. 3 nu. 
3…”.
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and necessity inasmuch as the will and nature present occasions for 
differentiating their features in reference to the notions of freedom 
and necessity. Furthermore, though the themes may be three, in 
general, the treatment of nature is never independent from that of 
will since the conceptual contrast aimed at is always some kind of 
distinction of nature from the will. The order to be followed will be 
that used by Juan himself, namely, ﬁ rst a discussion of the voluntary 
and then a treatment of the will with the allied distinction between 
will and nature. The entirety of the ﬁ rst two disputations of the De 
actibus humanis are devoted to these themes, comprising nearly a 
tenth of the whole work.
1. THE VOLUNTARY
The ﬁ rst disputation introduces the various senses of the voluntary to 
be found in a number of authors, ranging from Aristotle to Gregory 
of Nyssa, John Damascene, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, 
who is credited with three distinct deﬁ nitions of the voluntary. The 
most important of these for subsequent discussion and the only 
one to require detailed analysis of its terms is the famous deﬁ nition 
of Aristotle at Nicomachean Ethics III c. 1, 1111a23-24: “...the 
voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle is in 
the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of 
the action.”4 As Juan understands it, the deﬁ nition’s genus, namely, 
‘internal principle’ is a univocally common term predicable of the 
intellect, the will, the sensitive and vegetative souls, the heaviness of 
a heavy body, and the lightness of ﬁ re; the balance of the deﬁ nition’s 
terms are meant to distinguish what is involved in the voluntary from 
the other items of which ‘internal principle’ may be predicated5. So, 
4. ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea III, 1, 1111a23-24. Juan’s Latin translation reads 
here: “Voluntarium dicitur quod est a principio intrinseco cum cognitione vel 
scientia singulorum in quibus est action.”
5. IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, Tractatus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 1, sect. 1, 
1a: “Genus in hac deﬁ nitione est principium intrinsecum univocum ac commune 
ipsi voluntati, intellectui, animae vegetativae et sensitivae, lapidis gravitati et ignis 
levitati; haec enim omnia suopte interno pondere suas erumpunt in actiones. Ce-
terae omnes, quae adduntur particulae, differentiae sortiantur rationem.”
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for example, the note of cognition eliminates the vegetative soul as 
the sort of internal principle that could govern a voluntary activity.
It is to this ﬁ rst deﬁ nition of the voluntary so understood that 
the second disputation returns after an interlude in which Juan 
discusses the voluntariness of original sin, the habits of the will, and 
the torments of the martyrs. The question at hand is whether the 
lower animals may be said to act in a way that allows their deeds to 
be called voluntary. The question was one that was raised frequently 
in the literature of the early seventeenth century, both by Scotists, 
such as Juan Iribarne, and Thomists, such as Gregory of Valencia, 
S.J. As we shall see, the difﬁ culties both schools saw in attributing 
voluntary actions to animals came from related elements in their 
respective action theories. Since Juan explicitly refers to Gregory 
of Valencia, S.J. when he presents his own view, let us start with an 
overview of Gregory’s position.
Gregory begins his treatment of the voluntary by reporting 
and criticizing in his turn the early sixteenth century theologian 
Jacques Almain, a theologian of the College de Navarre at Paris 
who had studied under the distinguished philosopher John Major. 
Apparently much inﬂ uenced by the thought of John Buridan and 
William of Ockham in terms of his moral theory, Almain claims 
in his Moralia that the voluntary is an act or a failure to act that 
abides in the power of the agent when all the required conditions 
for acting are present such that it is in the power of the agent to 
act or not.6 Gregory observes that this deﬁ nition does not ﬁ t the 
voluntary as understood commonly, but rather describes freedom. 
The voluntary is, instead, a more comprehensive notion:
The voluntary is clearly a broader notion than the free; for the 
act of loving God in someone blessed is indeed voluntary, yet 
neither in respect of speciﬁ cation nor with respect to exercise 
is that act free7.
6. JACQUES DE ALMAIN, Moralia in Aurea clarissimi et acutissimi doctoris theologi Ma-
gistri Iacobi Almain (Aegidius de Gourmont, Paris, 1518) cap. ‘De voluntario’, fol. 
1ra.
7. “Voluntarium autem latius patet quam liberum; nam actus dilectionis Dei in beato 
est utique voluntarius et tamen neque quoad speciﬁ cationem nec quoad exerci-
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Though we may ﬁ nd it remarkable that Gregory uses a theological 
example here when so many more obvious examples from everyday 
life would seem to sufﬁ ce, his choice of example is one that tells us 
something about his own thought and locates the classical place for 
testing the limits of theories of voluntariness and/or free action.
We see this quite clearly in his own positive treatment of the 
voluntary since, although his Latin version of the relevant deﬁ nition 
differs only slightly and unimportantly from that of Juan Iribarne, 
Gregory makes not simply knowledge, but knowledge of the end of 
an action part of the description of the voluntary.8 As a result of his 
gloss on the Aristotelian deﬁ nition of the voluntary, Gregory takes 
a rather unusual position, for a Thomist, in regard to the question 
whether animals properly have acts that are voluntary; he answers 
that properly they do not. The reasoning here is that formal 
knowledge of the end is required for an agent to ﬁ t the description 
of the voluntary, but an animal, though it may be aware of the thing 
that is an end, does not formally grasp an end. Hence the animal 
is not properly engaged in a voluntary action9. Of course, Gregory 
does acknowledge that, if we would reduce the requirement to 
simply awareness of the occurent situation rather than knowledge 
of the end of the act performed, animals do have voluntary acts, 
though in an imperfect and qualiﬁ ed manner.
tium est in beato liber…” GREGORIUS DE VALENTIA, S.J., Commentaria theologica, 
tomus secundus complectens omnia I-IIae D. Thomae theoremata, editio pos-
trema (Sumptibus Horatii Cardom, Lugduni, 1619), disp. 2, q. 1, punctum 1, col. 
121, B.
8. Ibidem, disp. 2, q. 1, punct. 1, col. 123, A: “Nam voluntarium est id quod ﬁ t ab 
intrinseco cum cognitione ﬁ nis.”
9.  Ibidem, disp. 2, q. 1, punct. 2, col. 125, A-B: “[U]t sensus eius doctrinae divi 
Thomae sit voluntarium, secundum speciem illius perfectam in sola rationali 
creatura inveniri; secundum imperfectam vero etiam in brutis; ut si quis diceret 
rationam animalis in homine perfecte, in mure autem imperfecte. Si vero volun-
tarium nominemus in praesenti id quod est ab intrinseco cum cognitione ﬁ nis 
formaliter, quatenus ﬁ nis est, tunc non est simpliciter dicendum agere bruta vol-
untarie, sed cum addito, videlicet, adiungendo particulam ‘secundum quid et im-
perfecte’, quoniam eiusmodi voluntarii non participant bruta omnino sed solum 
ex parte, quatenus, videlicet, cognoscunt ipsam rem quae est ﬁ nis, quam etiam 
cognoscit creatura rationalis cum cognoscit ﬁ nem perfecte, puta, etiam formali-
ter.”
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Probably because Gregory adverts to ‘animal’ as imperfectly 
realized in lower animals such as mice, but perfectly in humans as 
an analogue for understanding the difﬁ culties connected with the 
voluntary and thus hints at a kind of analogical sense to the term 
‘voluntary’, Juan is not simply content to disagree with Gregory 
in straightforward terms. Instead, he also categorizes the type 
of univocity that the term ‘voluntary’ enjoys, when he states the 
rationale for the opposing position. 
The substantive issue is whether animals’ action may be 
termed ‘voluntary’ or not. For Juan, the case for the voluntariness 
of animals’ actions is quite strong, since all that is required in a 
proper reading of Aristotle’s deﬁ nition of the voluntary, and even 
a correct understanding of one of Scotus’s own deﬁ nitions is an 
action arising from the internal principle and knowledge of the 
occurent object:
The Aristotelian deﬁ nition of the voluntary and even Scotus’s 
deﬁ nition are correctly applied to an action arising from the 
sensitive appetite of a lower animal as that action is determined 
to an object of pleasure known to the animal; accordingly, that 
action will be properly and univocally voluntary10.
To be sure, there are, for Juan, some difﬁ culties connected to the 
philosophical understanding of the animals’ psychological states 
and the precise limits of their awareness of the objects they seek or 
avoid. He enters into this matter in some detail since Scotus himself 
at IV Sent. d. 45 q. 3 art. 1 of the Ordinatio hesitates to assign to the 
lower animals any kind of memory that involves awareness of the 
past as past, that is to say, remembrance (recordatio)11. Yet, as Juan 
acknowledges, Scotus eventually does come around to the view that 
10. “Tunc sic: huic actioni <ed.: quaestioni> prodeunti ab appetitu sensitivo bruti et 
terminatae ad obiectum delectabile praecognitum convenit deﬁ nitio voluntarii 
Aristotelica, imo et Scotistica; ergo proprie et univoce erit voluntaria.” IOANNIS 
YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, Tractatus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 2, sect. 1, 11b.
11. I. DUNS SCOTUS, In IV Sent. [Ordinatio] d. 45, q. 3, art. 1 (Sumptibus Laurentii 
Durand, Ludguni, 1639; rpt. Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, Hildesheim, 
1968) 8-11. Ed. Wadding, X: 197-198.
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animals’ knowledge of the past as past is a plausible interpretation 
of animal behavior, even though the Subtle Doctor would prefer an 
explanation that simply appealed to an occurrent phantasm or image 
that contained the representation of a sensible object as pleasurable 
or painful to the animal rather than posit actual awareness within 
the animal of the object as past12. Juan thinks that once we posit, 
as he thinks the Scotistic school ought, knowledge of the past in 
animals their being aware of the ends of their actions is a probable 
claim, especially in the light of the examples Scotus himself gives of 
birds building their nests and different animal species interacting in 
mutually beneﬁ cial ways13.
But even deciding upon these details of animal psychology is 
not quite germane: the Aristotelian deﬁ nition of the voluntary does 
not invoke awareness of the end as a requirement. Hence, even if all 
we admit is that animals know what are materially ends, the notion 
of the voluntary can be satisﬁ ed in their case. Juan insists, however, 
that this is not simply the veriﬁ cation of the notion of the voluntary 
within animals’ activities, but the afﬁ rmation of a ‘univocal’ notion 
of the voluntary in both animals and humans. As alluded to before, 
this is probably because of Gregory of Valencia’s allowing for 
what is tantamount to an analogical notion of the voluntary in his 
discussion of the problem, but then Juan takes the occasion to point 
out that the notion of univocity admits of degrees for the Scotistic 
school and the lowest degree of univocity simply requires that the 
two items agree in the selfsame concept. This agreement can be 
found in the case of the voluntary when applied to humans and 
animals; indeed, even the term ‘will’ may be applied univocally 
to the sensitive appetite, Juan claims, if we reduce the content of 
will to simply natural inclination. The case is parallel with that 
of animals being generated by members of the same species and 
12. I. DUNS SCOTUS, In IV Sent. [Ordinatio] d. 45, q. 3, art. 1 [12] (ed. Wadding, X: 
200): “Ad ultimum, licet probabiliter possent actu brutorum salvari, non ponendo 
memorationem proprie in eis sed solum imaginativam cognitivam obiecti quod 
est praeteritum licet non ut praeteritum, tamen ea quae videmus in actibus eorum 
faciliius salvantur ponendo in eis memoriam. ” IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, 
Tractatus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 2, sect. 1, 11b.
13. IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, Tractatus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 2, sect. 1, 
11b-12a.
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animals generated (according to medieval physiology and biology)14 
by the spontaneous generation from decaying matter; both would 
and should be called ‘animals’ in the same sense despite their varying 
causal origins.
Before we leave the topic of the voluntary, I think we should note 
something else about Juan’s position here. He is, in effect, whether 
he knows it or not taking sides in an earlier difference of opinion 
within the Scotistic school that focused upon the very same issues. 
Although in the earliest period of the Scotistic school, the period 
of William of Alnwick and James of Ascoli,15 many Scotists did not 
accept the teaching of Scotus on will and nature, by the ﬁ fteenth 
century most Scotists did. How to align the notions of appetite, 
will, and nature was not something, however, upon which even the 
ﬁ fteenth century Scotists agreed. An example of a Scotist whose 
position is strikingly similar to the Thomist Gregory of Valentia, 
S.J. is the famous Franciscan Nicholas of Orbellis. Nicholas, too, 
argues that the voluntary is only improperly applied to animals and 
for the reason given by Gregory: animals only have an imperfect 
14. Curiously the same case recurs in more recent science with animals generated by 
the artiﬁ cial means of test-tubes and animals generated through the usual biologi-
cal processes.
15. See G. ALLINEY, La ricezione della teoria scotiana della voluntà nell’ ambiente teolo-
gico parigino (1307-1316), “Documenti e studi” 16 (2005) 337-39 and Libertà e 
contingenze della fruizione beatiﬁ ca nella scotismo del primo ‘300, “Veritas” 50 (2005) 
95-108. Cf. ALNWICK, Determinationes, q. 18 n. 94 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vati-
cana, Pal lat. ms. 1805, f. 146r): “Respondeo igitur ad quaestionem quod voluntas 
movet se ipsam per se et primo ad suum actum volendi et quod respectu cuiuslibet 
citra ﬁ nem potest libere se movere et non movere ad actum voluntatis respectu 
illius. […] Quaero igitur a quo effective est actus nolendi in voluntate: aut a volun-
tate, aut ab obiecto? Non ab obiecto, quia causa effectiva per se effectus positivi 
non est privatio sub ratione qua privativum est malum autem moris, ut peccatum, 
sub ratione qua malum est, privativum est et sic est obiectum actus nolendi; igi-
tur relinquitur quod actus nolendi sit effective et immediate a voluntate, et per 
consequens voluntas agit in se et movet se ad actum nolendi.” Cf. IOANNES DUNS 
SCOTUS, Ordinatio, d. 2, n. 149 (Ed. Vaticana, II, 100): “Ad tertium dicitur uno 
modo quod licet non sit ibi defectus alicuius boni nec aliqua malitia et ideo forte 
non posset voluntas illud nolle, quia obiectum actus nolendi est malum vel defec-
tivum, potest tamen illud bonum perfectum non velle, quia in potestate voluntatis 
est non tantum sic et sic velle, sed etiam velle et non velle, quia libertas eius est ad 
agendum vel non agendum.”
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awareness of the ends of their activities and the voluntary requires 
more than that16.
2. THE WILL: FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND NATURE
Juan lets us know as he enters into discussing will and its freedom 
that the voluntary is a genus but ‘free’ functions like a species:
It is clear from the points made above the voluntary is related 
in the manner of a genus and the free in the manner of a 
species, but ‘free’ is understood in Scotus’s thought as distinct 
at times from the necessary and at others it is distinguished 
from the natural17.
Getting clear on how these two senses of ‘free’ differ is, for Juan, the 
key to understanding the ultimate principles behind Scotus’s theory 
of action. The meaning of ‘freedom’ at stake in this second section 
is the freedom of contradiction or freedom involved in the ability 
to act or not act and hence freedom as distinguished from necessity. 
Juan argues that freedom in the sense of freedom as opposed to 
necessity is univocally common to God and creature and constitutes 
a pure perfection in God.
16. NICHOLAS DE ORBELLIS, In libros Ethicorum III (Basel, 1503) f. 207vb-208ra: “De-
clarat consequenter Aristoteles genus electionis, dicens quod omnis electio est 
voluntaria, sed non econverso. Voluntarium enim est in plus ut genus est commu-
nius speciebus. [...] Circa quod notandum quod bruta animalia non communicant 
in voluntario proprie sumpto. Voluntarium enim dicitur a voluntate quae est ap-
petitus intellectivus ex III De anima et dominatur suae operationi, nec necessario 
sequitur passiones appetitus sensitivi, sed potest agere et non agere. Bruta non 
habent huiusmodi appetitum. Communicant tamen in involuntario large sum-
pto inquantum habent in se appetitum sensitivum qui est principium intrinse-
cum suae operationis cum aliqua cognitione ﬁ nis, sed ista cognitio est imperfecta. 
Unde apprehendendo ﬁ nem non deliberant, sed subito feruntur in ipsum nec do-
minantur suae operationi, sed necessario sequuntur passiones appetitus sensitivi; 
et si passiones sint contrariae, cuiusmodi sunt concupiscentia et timor, sequuntur 
passionem fortiorem. Non sic homines.” 
17. “Constat ex supra allatis voluntarium habere se instar generis, liberum autem in-
star speciei; quod sane, quia apud Scotum interdum sumitur ut condistinctum ne-
cessitati et interdum ut opponitur naturalitati.” IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, 
Tractatus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 2, sect. 2, 13a-b.
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The Doctor holds the same conclusion in many places within 
his texts [...] and there is proof of this since everyone is 
aware that our will bears itself contingently in regard to any 
objects that it encounters in the present life -- nay, according 
to Scotus, the will is even borne contingently towards the 
Beatiﬁ c Object, at least that is by intrinsic contingency. Who 
doubts, moreover, that the divine will enjoys the freedom of 
contradiction regarding its activity ad extra?18
Notice the examples given here: the wayfarer with regard to any 
object in the present life and even the blessed as regards God in 
heaven with what Juan calls intrinsic contingency as opposed to 
extrinsic necessity, i.e., the blessed could will not to love God in 
the sense of fail to will to love Him, but they will not. Notice, too, 
that this type of freedom is found in God regarding any thing ad 
extra. Strictly speaking, in other words, this freedom would be 
found in God even in a world in which He willed not to create 
since then too a free decision bearing upon items ad extra would 
be found in Him. 
Juan now takes up a much thornier matter: what exactly is the 
meaning of free as opposed to the natural? Here we are thrown 
directly into the heart of Scotus’s metaphysical distinction between 
will and nature, a distinction that Juan, as we shall soon see, 
rightly understands as a ﬁ rst-order metaphysical distinction that 
is transcendental in scope. Is freedom understood in this sense, 
as able to be further speciﬁ ed by either necessity or contingency, 
univocally common to God and creature? Juan acknowledges that 
Aquinas and the person who is his contemporary representative for 
Juan, the Jesuit Gabriel Vazquez, S.J., would disallow such a sense 
of freedom in the case of God at least, for they align freedom with 
contingency utterly and only allow such contingency to be found 
18. “Hanc conclusionem tenet Doctor multis in locis [...] et probatur, quia in pri-
mis neminem latet voluntatem nostram in via contingenter ferri in quaecumque 
obiecta, immo et in patria docet Scotus ipsam, contingentia saltem intrinseca, 
contingenter in obiectum provehi beatiﬁ cum. De divina etiam quis dubio ﬂ uctuet 
liberrrime contradictiorie extra operari?” IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU Tracta-
tus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 2, sect. 2, 14a. 
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in God’s actions ad extra, whereas, for them, the natural and the 
necessary are concomitant features. The procession of the Holy 
Spirit, accordingly, is for them necessary, natural, and in no way 
free, except perhaps in the rather thin sense of free as unconstrained 
by anything else.
By contrast, Scotus defends the traditional Franciscan claim 
that the procession of the Holy Spirit is by will, voluntary, and 
free. To make sense of this, Juan explains that the necessary and the 
contingent align in a non-isomorphic way with the two fundamental 
senses of freedom: : freedom as opposed to necessity is co-extensive 
with contingency; and freedom as opposed to active naturalness may 
be found with either necessity or contingency. Juan’s examples are 
God’s loving Himself freely in the second sense, i.e., as opposed to 
naturally, but nonetheless necessarily in such as way as to produce 
the Holy Spirit, whereas He loves creatures contingently: 
For God necessarily yet freely loves Himself and produces 
the Holy Spirit in this manner, yet God loves creatures freely 
and contingently. Accordingly in God’s love towards creatures 
freedom is accompanied by contingency, whereas in His love 
of Himself and in case of the production of the Holy Spirit 
freedom is associated with the Highest Necessity. Likewise 
our will in its wayfaring state contingently loves God, but in 
heaven, when the will is blessed it loves God, clearly seen, 
freely, though by at least extrinsic necessity. Hence in the 
blessed’s love freedom is the companion of necessity, yet it is 
the freedom that is opposed to naturalness, but in the love of a 
wayfarer freedom is bound up with the liberty of indifference 
and contingency19.
Unsurprisingly, Juan’s conclusions are that freedom as opposed to 
naturalness is common to God and creature. The evidence is the 
parallelism: humans understand (nature at work), but will (will at 
work); God produces the Son (by natural production) and the Holy 
Spirit (by voluntary means). But freedom as opposed to naturalness 
19.  Cf. Tractatus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 2, sect. 3, 16b. 
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as speciﬁ ed by the notion of intrinsic necessity is not found 
commonly in God and creatures, for intrinsic necessity does not 
belong to the sole human act of will that has the feature of necessity 
at all, namely, the act of the blessed in loving God inasmuch as 
that act is intrinsically contingent and only extrinsically necessary. 
Furthermore, freedom as opposed to naturalness understood 
as speciﬁ ed by extrinsic necessity is also not common to God 
and creatures: God’s will cannot be constrained by any extrinsic 
necessity. What this amount to is that freedom as opposed to 
naturalness is found as paired with intrinsic necessity only in the 
case of God in his act of self-love; in all other cases freedom as 
opposed to naturalness is de facto accompanied by the mode of 
contingency, at least intrinsic contingency.
If we feel confused, perhaps even intellectually cheated at this 
point, we should. For matters are still none too clear. That is why 
Juan immediately adds another section on just the issue of what 
the liberty as opposed to necessity consists in and what the sense is 
of ‘naturalness’ that is at stake. The position of the Thomistae is to 
identify naturalness with necessity and freedom with the liberty of 
indifference. On this point Juan cites Vazquez, tom. 2, in primam 
partem ST, disp. 161 cap. 3. to the effect that Vazquez wants to 
distinguish within the will its operations as natural from those 
understood to belong to will precisely as will. Suarez is interpreted 
along the same lines; the text cited is Suarez’s De originibus, lib. 6 c. 
4. Suarez actually complains that Scotus should grant that the act of 
the will is natural and allow that one and the same act can be natural 
and voluntary20.
20. IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, Tractatus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 2, sect. 4, 
17b-18a. Suarez’s text at lib. VI, c. 4 reads: “Sed [Scotus] disputat tantum de no-
mine, nam libertas aliquando coactioni et sic verum est illum actum [producendi 
Spiritum Sanctum] esse liberum, id est, libenter factum. Proprie vero et magis 
absolute loquendo, libertas opponitur necessitati, ut ex dictis constat, et hoc modo 
non potuit Scotus asserere illum actum esse liberum; imo expresse fatetur esse ne-
cessarium. Non video autem cur negaverit vocandum esse actum naturalem, quod 
quod sit ab obiecto cognito non tollit quin etiam sit ex intrinseca inclinatione et 
determinationis voluntatis ad unum respectu talis obiecti. Illa autem determina-
tio voluntati naturalis est, quia voluntas suam habet naturam; ergo non repugnat 
voluntatis actum esse naturalem. Et sumendo liberum solum pro spontaneo, non 
repugnat actum esse simul naturalem et liberum illo modo, qui melius dicitur 
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But as Juan points out, Scotus does not hold any kind of 
position that would allow him to call the love involved in the 
production of the Holy Spirit both natural and voluntary. Here 
Juan engages in an extensive commentary upon Scotus’s Quodlibet 
q. 16. The difﬁ culty is that “nature” means a principle that does not 
determine itself to its activity, whereas “will” means something that 
does so determine itself even when it necessarily does so. Even if the 
‘determination’ is necessary the ‘manner’ of determination remains 
self-determination in the latter case. 
We should say that this distinction has to do with the differences 
between naturalness and freedom, because naturalness consists 
in the positive manner of determination to one, whereas 
freedom has to do with the positive manner of determining 
itself to its activity [...] therefore, just as in ﬁ re the positing of 
a determination to one and the denial of self-determination 
show there is a naturalness opposed to freedom, the words of 
the Doctor [in Quodlibet 16] should be noted: ‘the caused will, 
however, if it necessarily wills something, is not determined a 
causing principle to that act of will in the manner of a heavy 
object going down, but only in the sense that from a causal 
principle it has the principle that determines it to will’21.
But we might ask why can’t we just hold the position that will requires 
voluntarius.” F. SUÁREZ, Opera omnia (Apud Ludovicum Vives, Bibliopolam Edi-
tionem, Paris, 1856) 1: 682a.
21. “Dicendum est hoc discrimen versari inter naturalitatem et libertatem, quod na-
turalitas consistit in modo positivo determinationis ad unum; libertas vero inni-
titur in modo positivo se ipsum determinandi ad agendum. ... ergo sicuti in igne 
positio determinationis ad unum et negatio determinativitatis sui arguit naturali-
tatem oppositam libertati, notanda sunt Doctoris verba: ‘voluntas autem causata 
si necessario vult aliquid, non sic est determinata a causante ad illud velle, sicut 
grave ad descensum, sed tantum a causante habet principium determinativum sui 
ad velle’.” IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, Tractatus de actibus humanis cit., disp. 
2, sect. 4, 19a. The text of Scotus’s Quodlibet that Juan intends may be found in 
T. B. NOONE and H. F. ROBERTS, John Duns Scotus’s Quodlibetum: A Brief Study of 
the Manuscripts and an Edition of Q. 16, en C. SCHABEL (ed.), Theological Quodlibet 
in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century (Brill, Leiden, 2007), q. 16, n. 62-64, 
192-194.
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for its very functioning as free certain preconditions that can only be 
supplied by itself undersood as a nature? In other words, why can’t we 
just say that will is a natural agent in regard to some of its functions 
and free in regard to others? Thomas argues along such lines in 
Summa theologiae prima pars, q. 41 art 2. Bañez seems to hold this 
view, too, generalizing the claim to mean that will as free presupposes 
will as nature is a necessary precondition of its very freedom and 
activity. But this is precisely what Juan, basing himself upon the best 
of Scotistic grounds, simply disallows; for this is to attribute to one 
and the same entity the status of being a nature and a will as an active 
power. Juan denies that one and the same active principle can both 
act naturally and freely, for much the same reason that one and the 
same entity cannot be both ﬁ nite and inﬁ nite, i.e., ‘natural’ and ‘free’ 
are transcendentally opposed ways in which things are:
From these points it stands pretty clear to us that to act in 
a manner of freedom or freely and to act in the manner of a 
nature or naturally so divide the category of active principle 
that they cannot be found together in the same principle even 
with respect to distinct operations. For they are so related 
that they are like differences dividing a genus or like intrinsic 
modes; for example, inﬁ nite and ﬁ nite as these contract being 
which transcendentally is prior to them. Wherefore, just as 
one and the same being cannot be ﬁ nite and inﬁ nite nor to one 
animal can there be united rational and irrational, so too one 
and the same will cannot be a natural principle with regard to 
some operations and free with respect to others22.
22. “Ex quibus haud subobscure nobis constat ‘agere per modum libertatis seu li-
bere’ et ‘agere per modum naturae seu naturaliter’, eo usque dividere principium 
activum, ut nullo prorsus modo, eodem principio etiam respectu diversarum 
operationum cohaerere possint; habent se enim, vel instar differentiarum genus 
dividentium, vel instar modorum intrinsecorum, verbi gratia, ﬁ niti et inﬁ niti, ens 
transcendentissime supervolans ad se divisim contrahentium. Quamobrem, sicuti 
unum et idem ens ﬁ nitum simul ac inﬁ nitum esse nequit, neque uni cum animal 
rationale iungitur <ed. iugiter> et irrationale, perinde una et eadem voluntas na-
turale principium respectu harum operationum et principium liberum respectu 
aliarum nullatenus esse quivit.” IOANNIS YRIBARNE ET YRABURU, Tractatus de acti-
bus humanis cit., disp. 2, sect. 6, 23a.
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Summarizing the whole debate, Juan argues that the attempt 
to divide one and the same active principle, the divine will, into 
two opposed modes of functioning as an active principle is simply 
incoherent; this is what he thinks Bañez, Vazquez, and for that 
matter Suarez are doing.
What to make of all of this philosophically? The active power 
of will is what intrinsically has the feature of being autonomous 
or self-determinng. From our point of view, that autonomy is 
normally and usually found accompanying the sort of freedom to 
act otherwise, or what Juan calls the liberty of indifference/liberty 
of contradiction. But strictly speaking these two features can come 
apart such that the self-determination may be found with necessity 
as opposed to contingency. That is what goes on in the case of the 
Holy Spirit.
Yet it seems that, despite Juan’s best efforts, we are at a baseline 
disagreement that cannot be gotten passed. Aquinas, if Bañez gets 
him right, and Suarez want to oppose freedom to necessity or to 
coercion; in the former dichotomy freedom is contrasted to nature 
and all that is necessary is free, but in the latter sense an action can 
be free even if necessary through some internal principle. Scotus, 
by contrast, according to Juan, wants to distinguish freedom from 
necessity but also freedom from naturalness; in the former case, 
there is a strict division into free and necessary, but in the latter the 
distinction is between what is internally moved or autonomous and 
what is determined to one from without. Both of the latter may be 
necessary, but one is natural and the other free. Hence the realm 
of the natural and the necessary are not co-extensive. There seems 
no good way in which we can resolve this disagreement and Juan 
has given us little to understand how will, as a principle, has both 
the freedom of self-determination and the freedom of the ability 
to act otherwise as ordered properties. Perhaps that is why the 
issue of the distinction between nature and will is still an on-going 
philosophical question23.
23. Research for this paper was made possible by the ﬁ nancial support of the Spanish 
Government through its grant program: FFI 2010-15875 (subprogram FISO).
